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NOTES
A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE TREATMENT
OF PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS PATENT
INFRINGEMENT
Traditionally, products which defy description in terms of
their structure have been protected by patents drawn using prod-
uct-by-process claims.1 It is recognized that the product-by-pro-
cess patent affords infringement protection for the claimed prod-
uct and not the process by which it was produced.2 In two recent
cases, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit wrestled with
the scope of the protection, specifically, whether a product pat-
ented using a product-by-process claim is to be afforded full prod-
uct protection or protection limited to the product as manufac-
tured by the process by which it was claimed.
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,3
the Federal Circuit held that a product-by-process patent may be
infringed by production of the same product using a different pro-
cess.4 In Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,5 however,
the Federal Circuit effectively overruled Scripps Clinic by holding
that a product claimed by a product-by-process description is only
1 See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
In Painter, a proper exception to the general rule was found on the ground
that the product could not be properly defined and discriminated from the
prior art otherwise than by reference to the process of producing it. This
basic rule and the exception have been recognized and followed continuously
by the Patent Office and the Courts.
Id.; In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("[Wlhere the structural
formula of the chemical compound was known, product-by-process claims have been
refused by the board.").
2 Bridgeford, 357 F.2d at 682 ("[T]he invention so defined is a product and not a
process.").
3 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
4 See id. at 1583-84.
5 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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infringed when the allegedly infringing product is produced via
the same process as in the claim.6 It is submitted that the current
conflict arose because the holdings in these cases were overly
broad. These decisions would be able to co-exist if it were recog-
nized that not all product-by-process claims are the same.7
This Note examines the arguments concerning the scope of
infringement protection for product-by-process claims and con-
cludes with a proposal for legislative action to resolve the conflict
created by the court. Part I describes the historical basis and
evolution of product-by-process claims. Part II relates the history
of Scripps Clinic and Atlantic Thermoplastics. Part III analyzes
the holdings of the two cases, along with their subsequent history.
Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to the patent statutes to
provide explicit statutory infringement protection for product-by-
process claims which defy the typical structural definition.
I. BACKGROUND
The Constitution specifically provides for exclusive rights to
one's invention.' To secure these rights, Congress has promul-
gated patent laws in Title 35 of the United States Code.9
6 Id. at 846-47.
7 The actual results in Scripps Clinic and Atlantic Thermoplastics may have been
correct in spite of the conflicting holdings passed down by the court. Breaking down
product-by-process claims into different types rather than treating them all similarly
would have allowed for the results to stand without conflict. See infra notes 47-49
and accompanying text (categorization of product-by-process claims); see also infra
Part IV (proposed patent statute).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution states, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
9 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1992). Congress, in turn, has authorized the Patent and
Trademark Office to establish their own regulations. Id. § 6(a). Section 6(a) provides,
in part, that "[tihe Commissioner [of Patents]... may, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the con-
duct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office." Id. These regulations are
codified in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Patent and Trademark
Office also provides further guidance for patent practitioners in U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(5th ed. rev. 15 1993) [hereinafter MPEP].
Patents for new inventions may be broadly divided into four categories: utility,
design, plant, and reissue patents. See RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAw: A PRACTI-
TIONER's GUIDE 5-7 (1988) (providing further description of four categories). Utility
patents are based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 which states: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
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To validate the securing of these rights, all patent applica-
tions must sufficiently describe the invention such that one skilled
in the art is able to make and use the claimed invention and know
that the inventor had possession of that invention.' ° Since it is
often difficult to meet this requirement, broad discretion is given
to the method by which the invention may be described." The
tions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984). Product patents fall into
the category of utility patents because they primarily involve either a composition of
matter or a manufacture. See HnunurIa, supra, at 6.
A composition of matter is a combination of two or more substances. It
can include chemical elements, chemical compounds, or other components.
For example, pulp for making paper is a composition of matter.
A manufacture is a category for the remaining statutory subject matter
that is not a process, machine, or composition. For example, a human-made
genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil is pat-
entable subject matter.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984). The statute provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is mostly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.
Id.
11 See In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The court in Steppan
stated that '[b]y statute, 35 U.S.C. § 112, Congress has placed no limitations on how
an applicant claims his invention, so long as the specification concludes with claims
which particularly point out and distinctly claim that invention." Id.
The manner in which this requirement is to be met has been given broad scope.
See, e.g., In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (purpose of descrip-
tion is to ensure that inventor had possession of claimed subject matter); In re Moore,
439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting that concern is whether disclosure con-
tains sufficient information to enable one skilled in art to make and use claimed in-
vention); Steppan, 394 F.2d at 1013 (no limitation on method of claiming invention so
long as claims particularly point out and distinctly claim invention); see Ralston
Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1176, 1219 (D. Kan. 1984), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 772 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
"The patent statute contemplates the protection of bona fide inventions,
whether or not those inventions are capable of precise definition. Since in-
ventions are not always capable of descriptions in terms of exact measure-
ments, symbols and formulas, if the claims, when read in light of the specifi-
cations, reasonably inform those skilled in the art of both the use and scope
of the invention, and if the delineation is as precise as the subject matter will
permit, the requirement of specificity will be satisfied."
Id. (quoting Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 339 F. Supp. 1036, 1055
(E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975)).
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usual method for claiming a product is in terms of its properties or
structure.12 These claims are often referred to as "true" product
claims. 13
In contrast to true product claims, product-by-process claims
fully or partially define the product by describing the process or
method by which the product is made.14 In 1891, In re Painter
introduced the concept of product-by-process patents.1 " In
Painter, the court reasoned that an inventor should not be penal-
ized when it is impossible to sufficiently describe an invention in
standard product terms.16 Although upholding the validity of the
patent in Painter, the court noted that product-by-process patent-
ing is an exception to the general rule of using true product
claims.1 7
12 See Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(I[T]he PTO and the CCPA acknowledged product-by-process claims as an exception
to the general rule requiring claims to define products in terms of structural charac-
teristics."); In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (product-by-process claims
allowed where invention can not be described in terms of structure or physical charac-
teristics); see also David Beier & Robert H. Benson, Biotechnology Patent Protection
Act, 68 DENY. U. L. REV. 173, 175 (1991) ("In the field of pharmaceuticals, the pat-
ented product is usually described in terms of the structure of an active ingredient of
the drug substance.").
13 2 DONALD S. CHISOLM, PATENTS § 8.79 (1991). "A 'true' product claim is one in
which the product is defined in terms of structural characteristics only." Id.
14 Id. § 8.05. "A 'product-by-process' claim is one in which the product is defined
at least in part in terms of the method or process by which it is made." Id.
15 1891 C.D. 200, 57 O.G. 999 (Comm'r of Pats. 1891).
16 Id. at 200-01.
It requires no argument to establish the proposition that as a rule a claim for
an article of manufacture should not be defined by the process of producing
that article. On the other hand, when a man has made an invention his
right to a patent for it, or his right to a claim properly defining it, is not to be
determined by the limitations of the English language. When the case arises
that an article of manufacture is a new thing, a useful thing, and embodies
invention, and that article cannot be properly defined and discriminated
from prior art otherwise than by reference to the process of producing it, a
case is presented which constitutes an exception to the rule.
Id. (emphasis omitted). The courts have consistently followed the Painter rule in up-
holding the validity of patents obtained via a product-by-process description. See, e.g.,
In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
To comply with the description requirement it is not necessary that the ap-
plication describe the claimed invention in ipsis verbis . . .all that is re-
quired is that it reasonably convey to persons skilled in the art that, as of the
filing date thereof, the inventor had possession of the subject matter later
claimed by him.
Id.; see In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (claim allowed so long as there is
sufficient teaching); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (right to patent
should not be denied because of language limitations).
17 See supra note 16 (Painter court statement concerning claim content).
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After Painter, product-by-process claims were available only
where there was no other way to describe the invention.' 8 Modern
courts, however, have shown leniency in allowing product-by-pro-
cess claims where other descriptions are possible.' 9 The Patent
and Trademark Office synthesized the case law which expanded
the permissible use of product-by-process claims into guidelines
for patent practitioners in the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure.2 °
18 See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "Product-by-process
claims are not specifically discussed in the patent statute. The practice and gov-
erning law have developed in response to the need to enable an applicant to claim an
otherwise patentable product that resists definition by other than the process by
which it is made." Id.; Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 188
n.15. (8th Cir. 1976) ("A 'product-by-process' claim is a form of product patent for a
compound that cannot be described other than by reference to the process of making
it."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); Westwood Chem., Inc. v. Dow Coming Corp.,
189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 665 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("Claims defining a product by the
process of making it are permissible only when the product cannot be otherwise de-
fined."); Ralston Purina Co., 586 F. Supp. at 1219 ([Piroduct-by-process claims are
proper even if the product is capable of description in an allowable product claim, if
the product is incapable of description by product claims which are of a different
scope."); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (defining product-by-process
claim).
19 See In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In Pilkington, a
patent examiner rejected the applicant's product claim because it could have been
drafted without the use of a process description. Id. at 1349. The court, quoting In re
Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967), stated that 35 U.S.C. § 112 "placed no limita-
tions on how an applicant claims his invention" thereby finding "that the present
product-by-process claim satisfies the requirements of 35 USCS § 112, and is appro-
priate here." Pilkington, 411 F.2d at 1349-50; see Ralston Purina, 586 F. Supp. at
1219 ("A claim for a product defined by the process of making the product, or product-
by-process claim, is proper and not indefinite when the product is not fairly suscepti-
ble to description by its properties structure.").
20 MPEP § 706.03(e).
An article may be claimed by a process of making it provided it is defi-
nite. In re Moeller, 1941 C.D. 316; 48 USPQ 542; 28 CCPA 932; In re Luck,
177 USPQ 523 (CCPA 1973); In re Steppan, 156 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1967);
and In re Pilkington, 162 USPQ 145 (CCPA 1969).
When the prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be
either identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in a
product-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either section
102 or 103 of the statute is appropriate. As a practical matter, the Patent
and Trademark Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the myr-
iad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make
physical comparisons therewith. A lesser burden of proof is required to
make out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims be-
cause of their peculiar nature than when a product is claimed in the conven-
tional fashion. In re Brown, 59 CCPA 1063 [sic], 173 USPQ 685 (1972); In re
Fessmann, 180 USPQ 324 (CCPA 1974).
Where an applicants product is incapable of description by product
1993]
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While the Patent and Trademark Office promulgates the
rules concerning patent applications, the resolution of patent dis-
putes usually falls upon the courts. In product-by-process litiga-
tion, courts agree that the patented item is a product, as opposed
to a process.21 Courts disagree, however, about whether the same
criteria used to evaluate patent validity should be applied to eval-
uate patent infringement actions.22 In determining validity, the
focus is solely on the product itself.23 By contrast, when determin-
ing infringement some courts view the process description as a
limitation on the product claim.24 The ultimate resolution of in-
fringement protection depends upon whether a product-by-process
claim is viewed as: (1) a "true" product claim, 25 which would focus
solely on the product for validity and infringement; 26 (2) a product
claims which are of differing scope, he is entitled to product-by-process
claims that recite his novel process of manufacture as a hedge against the
possibility that his broader product claims may be invalidated. In re Hughes,
182 USPQ 106 (CCPA 1974).
The fact that it is necessary for an applicant to describe his product in
product-by-process terms does not prevent him from presenting claims of va-
rying scope, Ex parte Pantzer and Feier, 176 USPQ 141 (Board of Appeals,
1972).
Id.
21 See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[Determination of pat-
entability is based on the product itself."); In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535 (C.C.P.A.
1972) ("[]t is the patentability of the product claimed and not of the recited process
steps which must be established."); In re Taylor, 360 F.2d 232, 234 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
("[T]he Patent Office cannot here rely on... the proposition.., that a product-by-
process claim defines a process.").
22 Compare Scripps Clinic, 927 F.2d at 1583 ( C]laims must be construed the
same way for validity and for infringement.... .") with Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970
F.2d at 846 ("The PTO's treatment of product-by-process claims as a product claim for
patentability is consistent with policies giving claims their broadest reasonable inter-
pretation. The same rule, however, does not apply in validity and infringement
litigation.").
23 See supra note 22 (showing focus of validity actions).
24 See General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 373 (1938)
([A] patentee who does not distinguish his product from what is old except by refer-
ence, express or constructive, to the process by which he produced it, cannot secure a
monopoly on the product by whatever means produced."). However, the crux of the
decision in Wabash was based on the inadequacy of the description. Id. at 369. See
generally Eric P. Mirabel, Product-By-Process Claims: A Practical Perspective, 68 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 3, 35-43 (1986) (citing cases limiting product infringe-
ment cause of action to situations where identical or equivalent processes were used).
25 See supra note 13 (defining "true" product claim); see also Scripps Clinic, 927
F.2d at 1583.
26 If an invention has been patented, the patent requirements concerning the suf-
ficiency of the description, the invention's unobviousness, and the novelty of the in-
vention would provide enough specificity to enable the courts to determine both valid-
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claim taken in conjunction with process limitations,27 which
might use different criteria for validity and infringement; or (3) a
distinct type of claim,28 which would be evaluated according to a
prescribed method, based on the specific interaction between the
product and the claim.29
II. THE CURRENT CONFLICT
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handed down
conflicting rulings less than one and one-half years apart concern-
ing infringement of product-by-process claims. The first was
Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., ° in
which the plaintiff patent owner of "Ultrapurification of Factor
VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies"3 ' alleged that its product-by-
process claims were infringed by Genentech.3 2 Genentech coun-
tered that the Scripps claim was limited to the method by which it
was produced; thus, Genentech argued its product did not in-
fringe because the Genentech product was produced by a different
method.3 3 The district court denied summary judgment to Scripps
on its product-by-process claims. 4
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that a product-by-process
ity and infringement actions in the same manner. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984)
(requirement of "unobviousness"). This section provides, in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (patent statute section entitled "Conditions for patentability;
novelty and loss of right to patent"); supra note 11 (Ralston Purina quote); supra note
10 (35 U.S.C. § 112 - patent statute concerning "sufficiency").
27 See Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846.
28 See Mirabel, supra note 24, at 3-4 n.2 (product-by-process claims should be dis-
tinguished from product claims with process limitation).
29 See infra Part IV (proposing amendment to patent statutes).
30 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
31 Id. at 1568. This invention involved the production of highly concentrated Fac-
tor VIH:C, a clotting or precoagulant factor found in blood plasma. Id. Researchers at
Scripps managed to produce Factor VIII:C with a concentration at least 160,000 times
as great as that naturally occurring in human plasma. Id. at 1570.
32 Id. One example of the product-by-process claims in dispute is claim 13 which
reads as follows: "Highly purified and concentrated human or porcine VIII:C prepared
in accordance with the method of claim 1." Id.
33 Id. at 1580.
34 See id. at 1583. The court also took note of the district court's statement that
1993] 929
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patent can be infringed by one who makes the product through a
different process.35 The court explained that
[i]n determining patentability we construe the product as not
limited by the process stated in the claims. Since claims must be
construed the same way for validity and for infringement, the
correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they are not
limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the
claims .... Infringement of the product-by-process claims may
be considered at trial.
36
The Federal Circuit subsequently decided Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 7 In that case, the products at
issue were two shock absorbing shoe innersoles which used solid
elastomeric inserts created by different processes.38
The district court determined that Atlantic Thermoplastics'
patented innersole was limited by the claims which defined the
process.39  On appeal, Atlantic Thermoplastics, citing Scripps
Clinic, argued that product-by-process claims should not be lim-
ited to the product created by the process described in the patent
claim.4 0 This time, the Federal Circuit held that product-by-pro-
cess claims could only be infringed by producing the same product
via the same process.41 Furthermore, in a footnote to the decision,
Judge Rader, author of the panel decision, criticized the Scripps
the "product-by-process claims would not be infringed unless the same process were
practiced." Id.
35 927 F.2d at 1583-84. This issue was remanded for further determination. Id.
at 1584.
36 Id.
37 970 F.2d at 834.
38 See id. at 835. The patent in contention was for an innersole manufactured by
Atlantic Thermoplastic's claimed process which included the insertion of a solid elas-
tomeric material into the mold. Id. This material was required to be tacky so that it
would stay in place during the injection of the polyurethane material. Id. at 835-36.
Faytex was a distributor of half-innersoles (heel cups) with an elastomeric insert
which were manufactured by competitors of Atlantic Thermoplastics, Surge Products
and Sorbothane. Id. at 836. The innersoles manufactured by Sorbothane used a pro-
cess whereby a liquid elastomeric was injected into the mold. Id. This liquid then
solidified to form the insert. Id. The Surge product was virtually identical to the pro-
cess patented by Atlantic, and both parties agreed that the Surge innersoles infringed
the Atlantic patent. Id. Thus, the Surge Products innersoles were not at issue. Id.
39 Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., No. 88-0210-H, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20050, at *19-32 (D. Mass. July 27, 1990).
40 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 838.
41 Id. at 846-47. "In light of Supreme Court caselaw and the history of product-
by-process claims, this court acknowledges that infringement analysis proceeds with
reference to the patent claims. Thus, process terms in product-by-process claims
serve as limitations in determining infringement." Id.
PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS PATENT
Clinic court for ignoring Supreme Court precedent when render-
ing their decision.42
Atlantic Thermoplastics was followed by two denials of re-
hearing en banc. 43 Upon the second denial for rehearing en banc,
Judge Newman, author of the Scripps Clinic decision, wrote a
scathing dissent criticizing the decision handed down by the At-
lantic Thermoplastics court." Judge Newman disputed Judge Ra-
der's contention that the Scripps Clinic court ignored Supreme
Court precedent.4 5 Interestingly, the votes in favor of rehearing
came from the four judges who had patent or intellectual property
backgrounds, including the panel which decided Scripps Clinic.46
III. CATEGORIZATION OF PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIMS
As Judge Newman observed in her dissent, product-by-pro-
cess claims generally can be categorized as follows: "(1) when the
product is new and unobvious, but is not capable of independent
definition; (2) when the product is old or obvious, but the process
is new; and (3) when the product is new and unobvious, but has a
42 Id. at 838 n.2.
This court in Scripps Clinic ruled without reference to the Supreme Court's
previous cases involving product claims with process limitations. In the ab-
sence of responsive briefing of the issues by the Scripps Clinic parties, this
court noted that it was reviewing an "undeveloped record," and devoted one
paragraph to resolving the jurisdictional issue and one paragraph to the
merits.... A decision that fails to consider Supreme Court precedent does
not control if the court determines that the prior panel would have reached a
different conclusion if it had considered controlling precedent.
Id. (citation omitted).
43 See Atlantic Themoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rader, J., concurring).
44 See Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1281-98 (Newman, J., dissenting); see
also Don J. DeBenedictis, Inconsistent Patent Rulings: Federal Circuit Judge Laments
"Mutiny" by Panel in Call for En Banc Hearing, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 36 (discussing
procedural history of two cases).
45 See Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1289-93 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Judge Newman individually addressed every issue raised by Judge Rader and de-
tailed her interpretation of the caselaw which was consistent with the decision
reached in Scripps Clinic. Id. at 1281-98 (Newman, J., dissenting).
One of the goals upon founding the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was uniformity of decisions. See DeBenedictis, supra note 44, at 36. The overruling of
the decision in Scripps Clinic without an en banc hearing was inconsistent with the
intentions of the Federal Circuies first Chief Judge, Howard Markey. Id. Chief Judge
Markey envisioned that no panel of the court would overrule another without an en
bane hearing. Id.
46 See DeBenedictis, supra note 44, at 36 (discussing division ofjudges on vote for
rehearing); see also Scripps Clinic, 927 F.2d at 1565.
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process-based limitation (e.g. a 'molded' product)."47
It is suggested that only the first type of claim, as defined by
Judge Newman, be considered a "true" product-by-process claim.
Reasonably, one may conclude that the second and third types of
claims cover products which are inextricably intertwined with the
process. This is because either the novelty can be depicted only by
describing the process, as in the second type of claim, or because
the claim is self-limiting, as in the third type of claim. Therefore,
it seems appropriate that the products listed as type two and
three claims be termed process-limited product claims 48 and
would only be infringed when the products are produced via the
same process. By contrast, this would leave the first type of claim
as the "true" product-by-process claim envisioned in Painter.49
In interpreting prior holdings, the majority in Atlantic
Thermoplastics failed to differentiate between product-by-process
claims in which the product could be defined by its structure or
characteristics and those in which it could not.5 0 The court simply
47 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1284 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Type (2) includes the Atlantic class of claim; such claims are examined as
process claims, their validity depends on the novelty and unobviousness of
the process and they are infringed only when the process is used.
Type (1) is the Scripps class of claim; such claims are examined as product
claims, their validity depends on the novelty and unobviousness of the prod-
uct, and they are infringed by the product however made. Indeed, claims of
types (2) and (3) are not properly called "product-by-process" claims, if that
term is used with precision.
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Judge Newman based her categori-
zations on an article by Eric P. Mirabel. Id. at 1284 n.4 (Newman, J., dissenting). See
generally Mirabel, supra note 24, at 3-11 (discussing classification and definition of
product claims).
48 See Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884) (pat-
ent for product cannot be obtained where new process yields known product); see also
Tri-Wall Containers, Inc. v. United States, 408 F.2d 748, 750 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("It is well
established that a product claimed as made by a new process is not patentable unless
the product itself is new."). Thus, we see that products are not patentable where their
novelty lies merely in their production by a new process. Type (2) claims would there-
fore relate to products in which the novelty must be depicted by defining the product
in terms of its difference in production.
49 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (defining "true" product claim).
50 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1284 (Newman, J., dissenting).
The cases that the Atlantic panel states support its conclusion that
Scripps was wrongly decided do not relate to the class of "true" product-by-
process claim that was at issue in Scripps. Most of the cases that the Atlan-
tic panel relies on do not even concern new products. Indeed, most courts
have avoided the pitfall that has befallen our colleagues in Atlantic; for most
courts, interpreting claims in accordance with the classical criteria of the
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combined all prior case law to formulate a "one-rule-fits-all law."5 1
In all likelihood, had Judge Rader followed the classification
system outlined by Judge Newman,52 the result in Atlantic
Thermoplastics would be unchanged. The Atlantic Thermoplas-
tics innersole falls into the second category of product-by-process
claims.53 Since the process was integral to the product, the in-
fringement protection should be limited by the defining process.54
The problem created by the Atlantic Thermoplastics court arose
from the overly broad holding that product-by-process claims are
infringed only when the allegedly infringing product is made by
the same process.5 5
In his concurrence with the second denial of rehearing, Judge
Rader interpreted the Supreme Court position to be that applica-
tion of process limitations is not restricted to cases where the
product is old. 56 His interpretation partly relied on the concept
that "[s]ome processes-like a chemical purification process-
might yield a different product each time performed."57 If this
were so, then the enabling requirements of the patent statute
would not be fulfilled, thus precluding the original issue of the
patent.5 8 In addition, Judge Rader implied that without process
specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art, have simply looked
to see what the invention was, and interpreted the claims accordingly.
Id.
51 Id.
52 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (creating three categories of product-
by-process claims).
53 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 47 and 48 (describing proposed limitations
on type two and three claims).
55 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846-47 ("[Plrocess terms in product-by-
process claims serve as limitations in determining infringement.").
56 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1302 (Rader, J., concurring). "'[Nlothing
can be held to infringe the patent which is not made by that process.' The Supreme
Court enunciated that rule because otherwise the claims would 'give no information
as to how [the product] is to be identified.'" Id. (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting Coch-
rane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884)) (citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
57 Id. at 1302 n.4.
58 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984). Section 112 provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe
specification shall contain a written description.., in such.., terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same ... ." Id.
Thus, for a person to receive a patent, even via a product-by-process claim, the specifi-
cation must provide sufficient information to allow the reproduction of the product.
See id. Consequently, the fear of being unable to determine the product being pro-
duced seems unfounded. See Clairol Inc. v. Brentwood Indus., Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 683, 687 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("Such 'product-by-process' claims, however, must
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limitations on the product, all product patent applicants would at-
tempt to claim their inventions in product-by-process terms.5 9
This concern conflicts with the previously recognized principle
that the breadth of product coverage afforded by a product-by-pro-
cess claim is much narrower than that of a "true" product claim.60
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
It is submitted that legislative action is necessary to resolve
the contradictory holdings of the two Federal Circuit decisions.
One likely solution is to modify Title 35 of the United States Code
to provide special regulations for product-by-process claims. 1 A
section should specify what would constitute infringement of
"true" product-by-process claims, such as those claims fitting the
Painter criteria. 62 As Judge Newman pointed out, "[tihe Painter
rule is a practical solution to an important problem, whereby law
and practice are adapted to complex products in order to imple-
ment the purposes of the patent law. This rule continues to serve
the purposes of the law."63 Codification of the Painter rule, com-
bined with the lenient claiming mechanism allowed by the Patent
and Trademark Office, would provide the necessary guidance to
mend the rift created by the court.
64
independently meet the statutory requirements of novelty (35 U.S.C. 102) and inven-
tion (35 U.S.C. 103)."). See generally Mirabel, supra note 24, at 28-35 (discussing
enabling requirement and necessity that product be produced by recited process).
59 See Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1303 (Rader, J., concurring). Judge
Rader noted that "[i]f courts did not enforce the only limitations in product-by-process
claims, then every patent applicant would have an incentive to claim in process,
rather than structural, terms because product-by-process claims would have few, if
any, limitations." Id.
60 Pfizer Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 188 n.15 (8th Cir.
1976) ("A 'product-by-process' claim ... is substantially narrower and less desirable
than the broad product claims, covering hundreds of compounds ... ."), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1040 (1977); see also MPEP, supra note 20, 93; infra text accompanying
notes 65-67 (limitations of proposed legislation).
61 Title 35 already provides distinct protection for other difficult patent areas
such as design and plant patents. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1984) (statutory provi-
sions concerning design patents); 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1984) (statutory provisions
concerning plant patents).
62 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (Painter rule and rationale).
63 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1288 (Newman, J., dissenting). It is pos-
ited that the codification of product-by-process claims into different categories would
eliminate the conflicting decisions which arose from being able to structure claims in
more than one fashion. Courts have historically litigated each case on its individual
merits. Id. at 1284 (Newman, J., dissenting). A statutory amendment would ensure
continued compliance by producing a framework for the courts.
64 See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, 425 U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (viewing 35 U.S.C. § 103
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A potential statutory revision that synthesizes appropriate
case law might read as follows:
Product-by-Process Patent.
(a) Products which defy description in terms of their structure or
other physical characteristics may be claimed in terms of the pro-
cess by which they are produced. These claims shall be infringed
by unauthorized production, during the life of the patent, of the
identical product produced by any means. Claims made under
this section shall be specially designated as "product-by-process."
(b) Products which are capable of description in terms of their
structure or other physical characteristics may be claimed in
terms of the process by which they are produced. These claims
shall be infringed by unauthorized production, during the life of
the patent, of the identical product by the same or an equivalent
process.
(c) Claims made under this section must still meet all other re-
quirements contained within this title.
Any special protection afforded under this statute would actu-
ally be very narrow.65 The scope of protection from infringement
would only cover the identical product which results from the de-
scriptive process, rather than the range of products often encom-
passed under a "true" product claim.66 This statute would also
require that the product defy definition by structural terms in or-
der to obtain this special protection.6 7 Availability of product-by-
process claims for products which can be described in terms of
"as a codification of judicial precedents" (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17 (1966)) (referring to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851)).
65 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (stating that product-by-process
claims are narrower and less desirable than true product claims).
66 See Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884)
("[Tihe process described in th[e]se patents, to be a sufficient support for a valid pat-
ent, as being properly described, must be a process which will produce that article and
no other. .. ").
67 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (Painter rationale). The special pro-
tection of the proposed legislation would be consistent with the history of product-by-
process case law. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 394 F.2d 591, 594 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
This court has repeatedly held that a claim for an article capable of such
definition must define the article by its structure and not by the process of
making it. In re Butler, 37 F.2d 623, 17 CCPA 810; In re Grupe, 48 F.2d 936,
18 CCPA 1262; In re McKee, 25 CCPA 1000, 95 F.2d 264; 37 USPQ 209; In
re Moeller, [28 CCPA 932, 117 F.2d 565, 48 USPQ 542]; In re Shortell, 173
F.2d 994, [sic] 36 CCPA 1013; In re Lifton, 189 F.2d 261, 38 CCPA 1119.
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their structure would not be eliminated, but would be read as lim-
ited by the defining process.
CONCLUSION
The dissents and concurrences for denial of rehearing en banc
in Atlantic Thermoplastics illustrate a court divided on a signifi-
cant patent issue. This division raises the troublesome possibility
that future decisions concerning infringement of product-by-pro-
cess patents could vary based upon the panel the litigants receive.
Resolution of this rift is essential to the stability and predictabil-
ity of product-by-process patent infringement cases. The special
protection provided by product-by-process patents is particularly
necessary in the areas of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, due
to the high costs of research and investment.68 Legislation at this
68 See Dan L. Burk, Application of United States Patent Law to Commercial Activ-
ity in Outer Space, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 295, 306 (1991) ("In
the biotechnology industry, where initial investment is already high and research and
development costs may consume more than 40% of a firm's expected revenues, the
assurance of patent protection seems especially important."); Carlos A. Fisher, Com-
ment, Unfair Trade Practices in Biotechnology: The Legacy of In Re Durden, 21 Sw. U.
L. REv. 1103, 1138 (1992) ("The continued vitality of the United States biotechnology
industry following such an enormous outlay of capital clearly depends on adequate
patent protection of biological inventions.").
Recent product-by-process claim litigation reveals an upward trend in the areas
of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. See, e.g., Fiers v. Sugano, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (DNA for fibroblast beta-interferon); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.) (DNA for erythropoietin), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 169
(1991); Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (transdermal nicotine delivery system). The complexities of chemical com-
pounds and biological structures often necessitate that claims be grounded in the
Painter rule. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 ("A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a
complex one, and... our law... requires that the inventor be able to define it so as to
distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it."). The extensive
investment necessary to develop these items mandates specific infringement protec-
tion. See Kenneth D. Sibley, Practical Utility: Evolution Suspended?, 32 IDEA: J.L. &
TECH. 203, 230 (1992)
Pharmaceutical research in particular is an expensive and risky undertak-
ing. The highs costs and risks of this research, combined with the specula-
tive nature of the protection available for the fruits of the research, creates a
need in those investing in such research for as much certainty and predict-
ability in the patent laws as the courts can provide.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Phillip B.C. Jones, Patentability of the Products and Processes
of Biotechnology, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 372,373 (1991) ("[A] therapeutic
product requires an average of $240 million and 10 to 12 years to bring the product to
the market .... ."). Failure to provide protection could have a "chilling" effect on re-
search and testing efforts to develop new technology in these areas. See Elizabeth J.
Hecht, Note, Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy Over
Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1023, 1039 n.97 (1992) (ab-
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juncture would foreclose potential problems. It is hoped that Con-
gress will take the necessary measures to avoid future uncertainty
for patent holders in actions for infringement of product-by-pro-
cess patents.
Alan L Cohen
sence of patent protection would discourage private investment in biotechnology re-
search); Reagan A. Kulseth, Note, Biotechnology and Animal Patents: When Someone
Builds a Better Mouse, 32 ARiz. L. REV. 691, 697 (1990) ("[Ulnless patent protection
for transgenic products is available, many corporations will lose their incentive to
continue supporting biotechnology because generic companies wil copy products and
undersell the inventors.").
1993]

